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West Virginia's "Business Liability Protection Act" of 2018' purports to
protect property owners, employers and others from claims related to firearms
stored inside the vehicles of employees and customers parked on business
property. The Act, in part, does what its title claims. As long as the employee or
customer securely stores his or her guns as provided in the Act, the employer or
property owner is immune from related civil liability.
But the Act does more than that. In fact, it creates a new cause of action
against property owners. If a property owner merely asks whether a firearm is
locked in a customer's or employee's car, the Act authorizes the Attorney
General and private parties to sue the property owner for as much as $5,000 per
violation and attorney's fees.2
Few issues are as divisive as the issue of gun rights. There is no doubt
that West Virginia is a strongly pro-gun state. Even as school shootings prompt
national discussions of stricter gun laws elsewhere, West Virginia citizens
overwhelmingly support the fullest expression of their Second Amendment
The author is an attorney practicing in Martinsburg, West Virginia, and a firearm owner.
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Law, West Virginia University College of Law and Professor Max Guirguis of Shepherd
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all the members of the editorial staff of the West Virginia Law Review for their edits, comments,
and valuable assistance with respect to this Article.
H.D. 4187, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2018) (amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14
(West 2018)). All references will be made to the future code section.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14(f)(4) (West 2018).
893
1
Tsiatsos: When the First and Second Amendments Collide: The Free Speech Imp
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019
WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW
rights.3 And the West Virginia Legislature has every right to fully protect its
citizens' rights to travel with their firearms. But it cannot do so by restricting the
right to speak freely. The importance of gun rights makes discussion of guns a
matter of national importance and intense public debate.4 By threatening to
punish speech about guns, the West Virginia Legislature has violated the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Part I of this Article will begin by examining the Business Liability
Protection Act ("BLPA") itself. Part II will examine similar (but importantly
different) laws passed by other states. Part III of the Article will survey the First
Amendment issues implicated by the BLPA. In applying First Amendment
jurisprudence to the language of the BLPA, Part IV argues that the BLPA is
unconstitutional as currently written. This Article then concludes by analyzing
the potential severability of the unconstitutional portions of the BLPA.
I. WEST VIRGINIA'S 2018 BUSINESS LIABILITY PROTECTION ACT
The BLPA revised the existing version of West Virginia Code section
61-7-14 which allowed property owners to prohibit guns onto their property. The
previous version stated, in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, any owner, lessee
or other person charged with the care, custody and control of
real property may prohibit the carrying openly or concealing of
any firearm or deadly weapon on property under his or her
domain: Provided, That for purposes of this section "person"
means an individual or any entity which may acquire title to real
property.'
Dan Heyman, In Spite ofMarches, WV Expanding Gun Rights, PUB. NEWS SERv. (Mar. 26,
2018), https://www.publicnewsservice.org/2018-03-26/health-issues/in-spite-of-marches-wv-
expanding-gun-rights/a61954-1 ("Although more than a million and a half people around the
country rallied for tighter gun laws last weekend, West Virginia has been moving in the opposite
direction."); see also Gun Ownership by State, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/gun-ownership-rates-by-state/
4 8 / (last visited Apr. 4, 2019)
(ranking West Virginia as the fourth highest state for gun ownership per capita); Keith Wood, Best
States for Gun Owners (2017), GUNs & AMMo (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://www.gunsandammo.com/editorialbest-states-for-gun-owners-2017/247983 (ranking West
Virginia as the 13th best state for gun owners in 2017-before the 2018 laws).
4 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008); Patrick J. Charles, The Second
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1143, 1144 (2015) ("With Heller having answered the question jurisprudentially by placing the
right to keep and bear arms alongside other individual rights, the discourse has now shifted towards
the Second Amendment's proper place in American society, and there is no shortage of
viewpoints.").
5 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14 (amended 2018).
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The former section also authorized criminal penalties for failure to
comply and set forth certain exceptions for hunters, target-shooters traveling
from shooting practice, law enforcement officers, on-duty Division of Correction
employees, United States armed forces, reservists, and National Guards.'
The new law, effective as of June 8, 2018,7 still allows property owners
to prohibit openly carried or concealed firearms on their property,8 but it
drastically rewrites the former statute by essentially creating a blanket exception
for firearms kept securely in vehicles in parking lots. Now, property owners
cannot prohibit "any customer, employee, or invitee from possessing any legally
owned firearm, when the firearm is (A) lawfully possessed; and (B) locked inside
or locked to a private motor vehicle in a parking lot; and (C) when the customer,
employee, or invitee is lawfully allowed to be present in that area."'
The next subsection of the BLPA creates a new prohibition-essentially
a gag rule against merely asking if a customer, employee, or invitee has a gun.
Subsection (d)(2)(A)-(C) states:
(2) No owner, lessee, or other person charged with the care,
custody, and control of real property may violate the privacy
rights of a customer, employee, or invitee, either
(A) by verbal or written inquiry, regarding the presence or
absence of a firearm locked inside or locked to a private motor
vehicle in a parking lot; or
6 Specifically, the previous section provided as follows:
Any person carrying or possessing a firearm or other deadly weapon on theproperty of another who refuses to temporarily relinquish possession of thefirearm or other deadly weapon, upon being requested to do so, or to leave thepremises, while in possession of the firearm or other deadly weapon, is guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than$1,000 or confined in jail not more than six months, or both: Provided, That
the provisions of this section do not apply to a person as set forth in
subdivisions (3) through (7), inclusive, subsection (a), section six of this article
while the person is acting in an official capacity; and to a person as set forth in
subdivisions (1) through (8), inclusive, subsection (b) of said section, while
the person is acting in his or her official capacity: Provided, however, That
under no circumstances, except as provided for by the provisions of paragraph(1), subdivision (2), subsection (b), section eleven-a of this article, may anyperson possess or carry or cause the possession or carrying of any firearm or
other deadly weapon on the premises of any primary or secondary educational
facility in this state unless the person is a law-enforcement officer or he or shehas the express written permission of the county school superintendent.
Id. § 61-7-14 (previous version).
The bill's history and effective date are available at
http://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills history.cfrm?INPUT=41 87&year-201 8&sessiont
ype=RS.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14(b). The Act does not apply to property which is also the
property owner's primary residence, id. § 61-7-14(a)(1), and the bill does not apply to vehicles
which are owned by the employer and used by the employee in the course of his or her employment.
Id. § 6 1-7-14(a)(2).
9 Id. § 61-7-14(d)(1)(A)-(C).
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(B) by conducting an actual search of a private motor vehicle in
a parking lot to ascertain the presence of a firearm within the
vehicle.
(C) Furthermore, no owner, lessee, or other person charged with
the care, custody, and control of real property may take any
action against a customer, employee, or invitee based upon
verbal or written statements of any party concermng possession
of a firearm stored inside a private motor vehicle in a parking lot
for lawful purposes; except upon statements made pertaining to
unlawful purposes or threats of unlawful actions involving a
firearm made in violation of § 61-6-24 of this code.o
To enforce this new rule, the BLPA allows the Attorney General "to
enforce the provisions of subsection (d) of this section" by seeking either
injunctive relief or "[c]ivil penalties of no more than $5,000 for each violation of
subsection (d) and all costs and attorney's fees associated with bringing the
action" or both."
While the Attorney General is required to bring such actions in Kanawha
County, the BLPA further allows any "customer, employee, or invitee aggrieved
under the authority of subsection (d) of this section" to bring a private action in
the county where the alleged violator resides or has a principal place of business
or where the alleged violation occurred.12 In such private actions, the plaintiff
would be able to recover the same injunctive relief and civil penalties ($5,000
per violation) available to the Attorney General.13 The prevailing party in such
private actions is entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
14
II. SIMILAR LAWS IN OTHER STATES
West Virginia is not the first state to pass a law protecting gun owners
rights to keep guns in their cars. Several other states have passed similar laws,
10 Id. § 61-7-14(d)(2)(A)-(C). Subsection (d)(3) also prevents an employer from conditioning
employment upon (A) the fact that an employee or prospective employee holds or does not hold a
concealed carry license or (B) an agreement prohibiting an employee or prospective employee
from keeping a firearm locked inside his car pursuant to the Act. Id. § 61-7-14(d)(3).
I Id. § 61-7-14(f)(1)-(3).
12 Id. § 61-7-14(f)(1)-(4).
13 Id.
14 Id. In contrast, the award to the Attorney General of attorney's fees under § 61-7-14(f)(2)
does not seem to depend on whether the Attorney General is the prevailing party. In addition, the
Act prevents employers from conditioning employment on the employee's holding a firearms
license. It also prevents property owners from prohibiting customers, employees, or invitees from
entering a business parking lot while carrying a legal firearm, for a lawful purpose, which is out of
sight within the customer's, employee's, or invitee's private motor vehicle. Id. § 61-7-14(d)(3)-
(4).
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sometimes referred to as "parking lot" laws." While the laws vary substantially
by state, they generally offer some degree of protection for employees or
customers who bring guns onto parking lots, and they partly immunize property
owners and businesses for acts stemming from guns kept in locked vehicles on
their property. 16
Two other states have enacted statutes punishing a property owner from
even asking about guns. Florida's statute contains language similar, in relevant
part, to West Virginia's BLPA.17 For example, Florida, too, prevents employers
from "violat[ing] the privacy rights of a customer, employee, or invitee by verbal
or written inquiry regarding the presence of a firearm inside or locked to a private
motor vehicle in a parking lot . .. "" And the Florida law similarly enforces that
right through authorized action by its attorney general and private plaintiffs.
Florida's law has been tested in federal court, although not on First
Amendment grounds. In Florida Retail Federation, Inc. v. Attorney General of
Florida,2 0 an association of Florida retailers challenged the law on multiple other
grounds, including because it treated businesses differently based on whether
their employees had concealed carry permits. If a business happened to have a
worker with a concealed carry permit, the law required the business to allow
customers to bring guns in the parking lot. However, if the business did not
1 See generally Terry L. Potter & Robert J. Rojas, 50-State Survey: Workplace Firearm Laws(Feb. 11, 2016), https://laborrelationslawinsider.lexblogplatform.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/253/2016/02/50-State-Survey.pdf. See also Malerie Leigh Bulot, "Bring
Your Gun to Work" and You're Fired: Terminated Employees' Potential Rights for Violations of
Parking Lot Laws, 78 LA. L. REv. 989, 995-96 (2018). Continuing state legislative action in this
field is ongoing.
6 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.7a (2004) (amended through 2012) and § 1290.22
(amended through 2017); ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800 (2005); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §237.106 (West
2006); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-9-55 (2006); LA. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-781 (2009); IDAHO CODE § 5-341 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-45-103 (West 2009)
(amended through 2014) and § 34-45-104 (West 2009); ME. STAT. tit. 26, § 600 (2011); TEx. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 52.061 (West 2011) (amended in 2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-28-7-2 (West 2012)(amended through 2017); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-90 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1313(b)
(West 2013) (amended through 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.1210 (West 2017); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.60 (West 2017). 1 have attempted to list the
states in this footnote by order of first enactment, although the statutory cross-referencing and
legislative history sometimes make that order uncertain. The statutes listed in this note are current
as of June 4, 2018.
17 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251 (West 2008).
18 Id. § 790.251(4)(b).
19 Id. § 790.251(6). The Florida statue expressly authorizes fee shifting in cases brought by
private plaintiffs, and incorporates a general statute relating to actions by the attorney general
which also allows fee shifting and awards up to $10,000 per violation. Id. § 760.51.
20 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
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happen to have an employee with a concealed carry permit, then the business
was not required to permit guns in the parking lot.2 1
By treating businesses differently without a rational basis for doing so,
the Court found that the law violated both the Equal Protection Clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well a component of
due process. 2 2 However, the Court upheld other portions of the statute under the
same equal protection and due process challenges, 23 and it rejected challenges to
the law on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth
Amendment or preempted by federal workplace safety laws.24
While the Court did not expressly mention the First Amendment or
consider any speech-related issue, it did very briefly mention the provision of the
law prohibiting businesses from asking about whether an employee has a gun m
his or her car. The Court stated merely that "[tihis ban on inquiries, on the use of
statements, and on searches is a corollary to the provision on securing a gun in a
vehicle. The ban's constitutional fate is the same as that of the underlying
provision." 25 It does not appear that the parties to the case specifically raised First
Amendment challenges.26
North Dakota, too, prevents public or private employers from making "a
verbal or written inquiry regarding the presence of a firearm inside or locked to
a private motor vehicle in a parking lot[.]"2 7 While there is no express provision
for attorney general enforcement in the statute, the North Dakota law does permit
private civil actions in which attorney's fees and court costs, as well as "all
reasonable personal costs and losses suffered by the aggrieved person," may be
21 Id. at 1291.
22 Id. at 1288 ("[W]hether viewed under the Equal Protection Clause or as a component of due
process, a state must not treat like-situated individuals or businesses differently without an
adequate basis."). A discussion of the standards governing the Equal Protection Clause and
substantive due process are outside of the scope of this paper.
23 Id. at 1293-96.
24 Id. at 1289, 1298. Parking lot laws have also been challenged in other states, but apparently
not on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.
2009) (rejecting a Fifth Amendment takings challenge to Oklahoma's parking lot law).
25 Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1293. As will be discussed infra, this dictum
stands in contrast to the Supreme Court's recognition of more robust First Amendment rights.
26 See Motion for Prelim. Inj. Request for Expedited Hearing and Mem. of Law at 9, Fla. Retail
Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008); Amicus Curiae Brief
by The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, Id. at 16; Society for Human Resource Management
("SHRC"), HR Florida State Counsel's ("HR Florida"), Human Resource Association of Broward
Counties ("HRABC"), Human Resource Management Association of Palm Beach County
("HRPBC"), and HR Tampa's Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of Pl.'s Motion for Prelim. Inj.,
Id. at 24-2.
27 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(1)(b) (West 2011) (amended through 2015).
[Vol. 121898
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recovered by the prevailing party. 2 8 As of this writing, there are no reported
decisions under the North Dakota statute. 2 9
In addition, states have restricted questions about guns in contexts other
than employment situations. The Florida Legislature passed a law preventing
doctors from asking their patients whether they had any guns in their homes.30
As will be discussed in Section IV, the Florida law generated litigation which is
particularly relevant to West Virginia's BLPA.
Ill. FIRST AMENDMENT BACKGROUND
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances."" The principles behind the First
28 Id. § 62.1-02-13(5).
29 With respect to other states, one author notes that a pre-passage version of Alabama's law
would have prevented employers from asking about guns in their employees' cars. However, the
enacted version apparently omitted that language. Aaron L. Dettling, An Analysis of Act 283:
Alabama's New Gun Legislation, 74 ALA. LAw 305, 308 (2013) ("The Senate version of SB286,
which later became Act 283, clearly prohibited employers from asking employees whether they
had a firearm in the car. That prohibitory language didn't make it into the final version of Act 283,
but some other slippery language did. Section 4(c) of the Act does not expressly prohibit inquiries
about firearm possession, but says that '[ilfan employer believes that an employee presents a risk
of harm to himself/herself or to others, the employer may inquire as to whether the employee
possesses a firearm in his or her private motor vehicle.' This language is awkward. From a textual
standpoint, there is nothing in Act 283 that prohibits an employer from asking its employees any
questions about gun ownership or possession, so language expressly authorizing the employer to
ask the question ifa specific condition is met would appear to be nothing more than sheer dictum.").
30 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.338(2) (West 2011) (stating that a health care practitioner "should
refrain from making a written inquiry or asking questions concerning the ownership of a firearm
or ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the patient, or the presence of a firearm in
a private home or other domicile of the patient or a family member of the patient" unless the
provider believes that such information is relevant, and subjecting medical providers to disciplinary
action for violations of that requirement).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. I. West Virginia's Constitution contains its own free speech guarantees.
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 7. However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals defers, as it
must, to United States Supreme Court precedent in First Amendment cases. See State ex rel.
McGraw v. Imperial Mktg., 472 S.E.2d 792, 805 n.43 (1996); see also Pushinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of
Law Exam'rs, 266 S.E.2d 444, 449 (W. Va. 1980) ("The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article III, Section 7 of the West Virginia Constitution are virtually identical in
pertinent parts. Both constitutional provisions prohibit the making of any law abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press. For purposes of this opinion, we use the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article III, Section 7 of the West Virginia Constitution
interchangeably. Article I, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution recognizes that the United
States Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. Accordingly, the decisions of the United
899
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Amendment are among our most cherished constitutional liberties.32 Freedom of
speech is "indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth"
33 and
equally indispensable to the continued growth of our free society.3 4 in fact,
freedom of speech constitutes the "indispensable condition of nearly every other
right or liberty."35
First Amendment jurisprudence is both highly philosophical and fact
specific, making it a particularly difficult area of law to succinctly summarize.
6
This Article will not discuss the many different areas of First Amendment law
largely unrelated to the BLPA.3 ' However, a background discussion of some of
States Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment are binding on this Court and,
consequently, will be used throughout our discussion of this issue.").
32 It is not easy to trace the origins of the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees.
Debates concerning the Bill of Rights are limited and unclear. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 383-84 (1974) ("The debates in Congress and the States over the Bill of Rights
are unclear and inconclusive on any articulated intention of the Framers as to the free press
guarantee. We know that Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and William Cushing favored limiting
freedom of the press to truthful statements, while others such as James Wilson suggested a
restatement of the Blackstone standard. Jefferson endorsed Madison's formula that 'Congress shall
make no law . .. abridging the freedom of speech or the press' only after he suggested: 'The people
shall not be deprived of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish anything but false
facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty, or reputation of others . . ."'). While in other areas of
law it is often possible to learn from English antecedents, with respect to Freedom of Speech,
antecedent English speech laws are often drastically dissimilar. See, e.g., SmR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, III COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1663 (Cooley ed., 1884) (noting
principles of English law antithetical to American freedom of speech principles, such as
imprisonment for slander and the "more heinous" case of "scandalum magnatum"-slander against
"great officer[s] of the realm."). Of course, the lack of similar English antecedents may be exactly
the point of the First Amendment.
33 Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980) (citing Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
34 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) ("The fundamental freedoms of speech and
press have contributed greatly to the development and well-being of our free society and are
indispensable to its continued growth.").
5 Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 465 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (which characterized freedom of thought and speech as "the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom" and which was
overruled on other grounds)); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise, 998 F.
Supp. 2d 908, 918 (D. Idaho 2014) ("The Constitution protects the rights of all citizens. Freedom
of speech may be the most important right to protect in order to maintain our republic.").
36 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 426 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Few dividing
lines in First Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably
give rise only to fuzzy boundaries."); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1300
(11th Cir. 2017) ("Despite its majestic brevity-or maybe because of it-the freedom of speech
clause of the First Amendment sometimes proves difficult to apply.").
37 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226-27 (2015).
[Vol. 121900
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the main areas of First Amendment law will help frame the subsequent analysis
of the West Virginia law.
From the heyday of the Warren Court's free speech decisions through
the present, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to strike down state laws
inconsistent with the First Amendment.3 8 Perhaps the most familiar principle of
the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is that courts treat laws
governing speech differently depending on the nature of the regulation.3 9 If the
law is aimed at the content of the speech, courts apply the highest level of
scrutiny-often referred to as strict scrutiny.40 Under the First Amendment, a
state "has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content" and "[c]ontent-based laws . . . are presumptively
unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests."4 1 A law is considered
content-based if it "applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or
the idea or message expressed."42 The Court has held that this "commonsense
meaning of the phrase 'content-based' requires a court to consider whether a
regulation of speech 'on its face' draws distinctions based on the message a
speaker conveys." 43
Viewpoint discrimination-"[w]hen the government targets not subject
matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject"-is "an egregious
38 For a summary of the famous free speech decisions of the Warren Court, see Suzanna
Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know ItLearnedfrom the Warren Court, 50 VAND.
L. REv. 459, 460 (1997) ("The paradigmatic protection of individual liberty is the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, which first received its most expansive interpretations at the hands
of the Warren Court."). With respect to the Roberts Court's free speech jurisprudence, see Joel M.
Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL'Y 63(2016). However, despite the First Amendment's extensive treatment since the Warren Court it is
not surprising that some speech issues may have thus far escaped constitutional review. See, e.g.,District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625-26 (2008) ("Other provisions of the Bill of
Rights have similarly remained unilluminated for lengthy periods. This Court first held a law to
violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech in 1931, almost 150 years after the
Amendment was ratified[.]").
39 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) ("When
enforcing this prohibition, our precedents distinguish between content-based and content-neutral
regulations of speech.").
40 Whether a court uses strict scrutiny or a lower form of scrutiny is not always clear. See, e.g.,Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371-78 (making clear that content-based regulations are subject to strict
scrutiny, finding that the regulations at issue were content based, but then apparently deciding the
case on the bases of intermediate or "heightened" scrutiny); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1
SMOLLA &NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:62 (2018). For purposes of this article, it will prove
easier to focus on the nature of the law-and whether it is content-based or content-neutral.
41 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 2227 (citations omitted).
43 Id. (citations omitted).
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form of content discrimination."' The Supreme Court has held that "i[t]he
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction."4 5
While a law can be content-based on its face, it can also be content-
based, despite being facially neutral, if the law "cannot be 'justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech,"' or if it was "adopted by the
government 'because of disagreement with the message [the speech]
conveys."'4 6 Both types of content-based laws must satisfy the strict scrutiny
standard.47
Courts have subjected a wide variety of laws governing content-based
speech to strict scrutiny. Some examples include: laws governing flag burning;"
laws governing sexually explicit programming;49 laws which treat signs
differently based on whether they are directional, political or ideological;o and
rules prohibiting utility companies from including political messages in their
billing statements."
Political speech, in particular, is at the very core of First Amendment
rights. Laws that discriminate against political speech are subject to strict
scrutiny,5 2 and courts have suggested that political speech may be afforded
additional protections beyond that.53 In any event, it is clear that "speech on
4 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
45 Id. (citations omitted).
46 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (citations omitted).
47 Id.
48 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) ("Although the Flag Protection Act
contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless
clear that the Government's asserted interest is 'related "to the suppression of free expression"' and
concerned with the content of such expression.") (citations omitted).
49 United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-13 (2000).
5o Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231-32.
5' Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1980).
52 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) ("[P]olitical speech
must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that
burden political speech are 'subject to strict scrutiny' . . . .") (citations omitted).
53 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("When a law burdens core
political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest.") (citations omitted); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinions in other cases
in which political speech has been "accorded special protection") ("invalidating ban on
editorializing by recipients of grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, in part on
ground that political speech 'is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment
protection"') (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984));
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-46 (1983) (discussing history ofFirst Amendment protection
for political speech by public employees); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
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public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values, and is entitled to special protection."54 Speech is deemed to be a public
issue when it can "'be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community' or when 'it is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public."'"5
Determining that laws are content-based and thus subject to strict
scrutiny is the first part of a content-focused analysis. Next, courts must
determine whether the law is "narrowly tailored to serve compelling state
interests."5 6 While the governmental interests are as varied as the laws in
question, courts often assume that the interest is compelling with little discussion
in order to proceed to the "narrowly tailored" analysis."
For a law to be narrowly tailored it cannot be overinclusive-that is, it
cannot "unnecessarily circumscribe protected expression."" A law prohibiting
certain speech must target only speech that is the legitimate subject of the
prohibition, and no other speech. For example, New York's Son of Sam Law,
which sought to ensure that crime victims were compensated from the
perpetrator's sale of literary rights related to depictions of the crime, was
overinclusive because it would have applied "to works on any subject, provided
that they express the author's thoughts or recollections about his crime, however
tangentially or incidentally."59
Similarly, recognizing that "the First Amendment needs breathing
space," the Supreme Court has analyzed speech-restricting laws using the
doctrine of "overbreadth."o The doctrine recognizes that "the possible harm to
(upholding FCC's "fairness doctrine," which imposes special obligations upon broadcasters with
regard to "controversial issues of [public] importance").
54 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (citation omitted).
ss Id. at 453 (citations omitted). But see id. at 452 ("'Not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance,' however, and where matters of purely private significance are at issue,
First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.") (citations omitted).
56 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015) (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 2231 ("Assuming for the sake of argument that those [aesthetic appeal and traffic
safety] are compelling governmental interests, the Code's distinctions fail as hopelessly
underinclusive."); First Nat'1 Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) ("Assuming,
arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling' interest under the circumstances of this
case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and
the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking.") (citation omitted); Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1312 (11th Cir. 2017) ("We accept that the protection of Second
Amendment rights is a substantial government interest, but nevertheless conclude that FOPA's
record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment provisions fail to satisfy heightened scrutiny."). As
will be seen below, the BLPA does seek to protect a compelling state interest.
58 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (citation omitted).
59 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121(1991).
6 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973).
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society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted and perceived
grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
statutes." 61 In short, "a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a 'substantial
number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep. "'62
But at the same time, to be narrowly tailored, a law cannot be
underinclusive, either. That is, a law can't be "regarded as protecting an interest
of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when
it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited."
63 In
part, this is because underinclusiveness "diminish[es] the credibility of the
government's rationale for restricting speech."' For example, a law that
prohibits the sale of violent video games to children on the grounds that violent
imagery is detrimental to children is underinclusive because the law does not
restrict the many other types of expression which expose children to such violent
65imagery.
Essentially, to pass strict scrutiny under the First Amendment, laws that
target content-based speech must be precisely tailored-neither too broad nor too
narrow. 6 6 But despite the often stringent judicial analysis of speech regulations,
laws regulating the content of speech may still prohibit certain categories of
speech, for example: incitement, 67 threats,68 false statements of defamatory fact
61 Id. at 612.
62 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (citation omitted). Some courts consider
overbreadth and overinclusivity together, and it often makes sense to do so. See, e.g., Clear Channel
Outdoor, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Windham, 352 F. Supp. 2d 297, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[A] statute
is unconstitutionally over broad, or overinclusive, if it includes within its prohibitions
constitutionally protected conduct."). Technically, courts seem more often to utilize the
overbreadth doctrine (as opposed to the doctrine of overinclusivity) to analyze questions of litigant
standing and the manner in which the law may be challenged.
63 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) (citation omitted); Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015) (citation omitted).
6 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994).
65 Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011).
66 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 751 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing core,
political speech).
67 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (noting "the principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
68 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) ("[T]hreats of violence are outside the
First Amendment.").
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(e.g., libel and slander),6 9 obscenity,7 0 and child pornography." But while laws
may restrict the content of speech which falls within those categories, the laws
must still do so without engaging in viewpoint discrimination. That is, the
"content discrimination" must be related to the nature of their "proscribable
content" generally without picking sides.72 For example, while "the government
may proscribe libel[,] . . . it may not make the further content discrimination of
proscribing only libel critical of the government.""
When the law regulating speech is content neutral-for example, when
it merely regulates the time, place or manner of the speech without regard to
content-the law is subject to a lower level of scrutiny. The government need
only show that the law "be narrowly tailored to serve the government's
legitimate, content-neutral interests."74 But the "narrowly tailored" requirement
doesn't mean that the government must choose the least restrictive means of
regulation. Rather, it is enough that the regulation "promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation" without burdening substantially more speech than is necessary."
While First Amendment cases often involve state action and criminal
penalties, the Amendment also applies to speech which is subject to civil tort
damages.76 The BLPA contains both state-action and private-action tort
elements. While it expressly authorizes civil suits,77 it also expressly authorizes
enforcement (and collection of penalties) by the West Virginia Attorney
General,7 a state official under the West Virginia Constitution.
69 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) ("For these reasons we conclude
that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for
defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual.").
7o Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by
the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.") (citations omitted).
71 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) ("As a general rule, pornography
can be banned only if obscene, but under Ferber, pornography showing minors can be proscribed
whether or not the images are obscene . .
72 R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
73 Id. at 3 84.
74 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
7 Id. at 799 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
76 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011) ("The Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment ... can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction
of emotional distress."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,265 (1964); Riley v. Jankowski,713 N.W.2d 379, 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
n W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14(f)(3) (West 2018).
7 Id. § (f)(1)2).
7 W. VA. CONST. art. VH, § 1. Whether the Attorney General will pay that money into the
State Treasury or not is an open question. No specific statute currently requires it, and a proposed
bill which would have required it was vetoed by the Governor. See H.B. 4009, 2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (W. Va. 2018) (vetoed 2018), (last accessed Mar. 21, 2019). This author's discussion with
13
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Finally, given the specific speech at issue in the BLPA, one more point
is worth mentioning. Although declarative sentences are often the subject of First
Amendment cases, the specific sentential function of the speech is irrelevant: the
First Amendment protects speech in the form of questions, too, such as the ones
penalized by the BLPA."
While First Amendment jurisprudence contains many other, often
complicated themes, this brief overview has attempted to outline the themes
necessary to analyze West Virginia's 2018 BLPA: what type or part of speech
does the law target, and can the government justify doing so?
IV. THE BLPA'S SPEECH RESTRICTIONS VIOLATE
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
To review, the BLPA prohibits speech by employers and property
owners. Specifically, it prohibits one type of speech: speech about guns. Under
the BLPA, if an employer or property owner asks whether an employee or
customer has a gun in his or her car, the employer or property owner is subject
to $5,000 in fines per violation, civil actions by the state Attorney General and
civil suits from aggrieved private parties.
There can be no doubt that the BLPA, on its face, discriminates against
speech based on its content." The Act does not try to hide this fact by pretending
to be content neutral. It punishes speech about guns and only speech about
the Attorney General's office on June 29, 2018, suggests that the ultimate destination of such funds,
as with other civil penalties recovered by the Attorney General, may depend on specific orders by
the court in each action.
so Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that
the First Amendment protects questions by doctors to patients concerning firearms in the patients'
homes); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030,
1051 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting that there is a "freedom to gather information [which is] guaranteed
by the First Amendment"); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death ofPrivacy?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461,
1508 (2000) ("[B]oth the Supreme Court and appellate courts have interpreted the First
Amendment to encompass a right to gather information."); Helen Norton, You Can't Ask (or Say)
That: The First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 760 n.139, 778, (2003) ("Speech that takes the form of a question is still
speech for First Amendment purposes. Questions, of course, seek to elicit information, and the
First Amendment protects information gathering."); Tung Yin, How the Americans with
Disabilities Act's Prohibition on Pre-Employment-Offer Disability-Related Questions Violates the
First Amendment, 17 LAB. LAW. 107, 114-15 (2001) ("The fact that the interviewer is asking a
question, as opposed to making a statement, does not strip the speech of First Amendment
protection. The view that presupposes that the First Amendment protects only the making of
assertions as opposed to inquiries has not been accepted by courts.") (citations omitted).
81 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) ("This commonsense meaning of
the phrase 'content based' requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech 'on its face'
draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some facial distinctions based on a
message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more
subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on
the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.") (citations omitted).
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guns.82 Therefore, because the BLPA is content based, uncontroversial Supreme
Court precedent requires the BLPA to pass strict scrutiny.
And, indeed, the BLPA is likely to pass the first step of strict scrutiny: it
serves a compelling state interest. A citizen's right to lawfully possess a firearm
is a core Second Amendment right, and the state has a compelling interest to
protect its citizens' constitutional rights. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Wollschlaeger v. Governor
of Florida." As referenced above, Wollschlaeger involved a Florida law which
prevented physicians from asking their patients whether they had guns in their
houses. Such questions had become a routine part of doctor visits when the
physician suspected risk factors related to guns.84 However, some patients did
not welcome the questions, and, based on their complaints, the Florida legislature
passed the Florida's Firearm Owners' Privacy Act." Among its other provisions,
the Florida law stated that a medical professional "should refrain from making a
written inquiry or asking questions concerning the ownership of a firearm or
ammunition by the patient or by a family member of the patient, or the presence
of a firearm in a private home" unless the medical professional believes in good
faith that the information concerning firearms "is relevant to the patient's
medical care or safety, or the safety of others."86
While the Florida law did not contain express civil penalties or authorize
suits against doctors for asking such questions, it did make asking questions
about firearms in violation of the Act "grounds for disciplinary action.""
Florida's professional discipline statutes, which were implicated by the Act,
provided for penalties up to $10,000 per violation and the possibility of
permanent license revocation, but Florida's Board of Medicine promulgated
regulations suggesting lesser disciplinary outcomes-penalties up to $1,000 and
possible suspension."
In a lawsuit brought by a physician and physicians' interest groups
challenging the Florida law, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had
no difficulty in reaching its initial finding that Florida's desire to protect its
citizens' Second Amendment rights from "private encumbrances" served a
82 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2017) (discussing
restrictions on questions about firearms by physicians and stating, "[i]n cases at the margin, it may
sometimes be difficult to figure out what constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment.
But this is not a hard case in that respect. We conclude . .. that the record-keeping, inquiry, and
anti-harassment provisions of [the Florida Firearm Owners' Privacy Act] constitute speaker-
focused and content-based restrictions on speech.").
83 Id. at 1312.
84 Id. at 1301-02.
85 Id at 1302.
86 Id. at 1302-03 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.338(2) (West 2018)).
87 Id. at 1303 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.338(8) (West 2018)).
88 Id.
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substantial state interest." West Virginia's BLPA is similar. The text of the bill
is designed on its face to protect the Second Amendment rights of employees and
customers.90 The NRA, undoubtedly the nation's leading Second Amendment
advocate, favorably summarized the bill as follows:
House Bill 4187, sponsored by Delegate Geoff Foster (R-
Putnam), allows lawful owners of firearms to transport or store
the firearms in locked, privately-owned motor vehicles without
fear of civil liability, criminal liability or employer retribution.
Throughout the country, many employers and business owners
have adopted "No Firearms" policies that extend beyond the
physical workplace or building to include parking lots-areas
often accessible to the general public and not secure. In order to
comply with these policies, many law-abiding gun owners must
choose between protecting themselves during their commutes
and being subject to termination by their employer. The
fundamental right to self-defense should not stop simply
because you park your car in a publicly accessible parking lot
owned by your employer or a business owner. 9 1
The limited legislative history of the bill also makes clear that the
purpose was to protect Second Amendment rights.92 Therefore, because the
BPLA serves a compelling state interest, it seems likely to satisfy the first prong
of the strict scrutiny test.
However, the BLPA fails the second prong: it is not narrowly tailored.
Again, Wollschlaeger is instructive. Florida wanted to prevent doctors from
harassing their patients concerning firearm ownership, so it passed a law
punishing doctors who ask such questions. But the Wollschlaeger court found
that the law already allowed a patient to "decline to answer or provide any
information regarding ownership of a firearm ... or the presence of a firearm in
89 Id. at 1312. ("The first interest asserted by the state officials is protecting, from 'private
encumbrances,' the Second Amendment right of Floridians to own and bear firearms. We accept
that the protection of Second Amendment rights is a substantial government interest . . . .").
Although the Wollschlaeger majority found that the Florida law served a compelling state interest,
it did not decide whether the law should be subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, it found that the
Florida law could not even pass intermediate or heightened scrutiny, and it expressly left undecided
the issue of whether strict scrutiny should apply. Id.
90 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14 (West 2018).
9' See West Virginia: Three Pro-Gun Bills Introduced During First Weeks of Session, NRA-
LA (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nraila.org/articles/ 2 0180126/west-virginia-three-pro-gun-bills-
introduced-during-first-weeks-of-session.
92 See WV House Bill 4187 - Business Liability Protection Act, House 3rd Reading, Vote,
Passage, YouTUBE (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-2HCcLvJ7 3KO
(comments of Delegate Foster at roughly the 5:00 and 36:00 marks).
[Vol. 121908
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the domicile of the patient or a family member of the patient."9' As a result, "any
patients who have privacy concerns about information concerning their firearm
ownership [could] simply refuse to answer questions on the topic."94 Because the
interest (patient privacy with respect to firearms) was already protected by the
patient's right to decline to answer, the part of the statute punishing doctors for
asking questions about firearms was unnecessarily overbroad.
Similarly, West Virginia's BLPA contains sufficient protections for
employees and customers without punishing speech. The BPLA expressly
prevents employers and property owners from taking any adverse action against
their customers or employees based on whether they have firearms in their cars.95
In light of those protections, there is no need to also punish the employer or
property owner's speech-such punishment is overbroad because it is not needed
to accomplish the legitimate goals of the legislation.96
The BLPA is overbroad in another way recognized by the Supreme
Court, as well.9 7 Presumably, many employers and employees would not object
to questions about firearms in their vehicles. Indeed, many people would
welcome the chance to speak about firearms and to engage in civic-minded
discussions about gun rights and the Second Amendment. However, the BLPA's
provisions are so broad that they chill speech even in contexts where the goal of
the Act-preventing harassment about guns-is not implicated."
93 Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1314 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.338(4) (West 2018)).
94 Id.
9s W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14(d)(2)(C) (West 2018) ("No owner, lessee, or other person
charged with the care, custody, and control of real property may take any action against a customer,
employee, or invitee based upon verbal or written statements of any party concerning possession
of a firearm stored inside a motor vehicle in a parking lot for lawful purposes, except upon
statements made pertaining to unlawful purposes or threats of unlawful actions involving a firearm
made in violation of § 61-6-24 of this code."). Furthermore, "[N]o owner, lessee, or other person
charged with the care, custody, and control of real property may prohibit or attempt to prevent any
customer, employee, or invitee from entering the parking lot of the person's place of business
because the customer's, employee's, or invitee's motor vehicle contains a legal firearm being
carried for lawful purposes that is out of view within the customer's, employee's, or invitee's motor
vehicle." Id. § 61-7-14(d)(4).
96 Although the BLPA, by its express terms, prohibits employers and property owners from
asking questions, it does so by virtue of its subsequent penalties. Therefore, it likely would not be
found to be deemed a "prior restraint"-a concept more often applied to gag orders or injunctions
and speech subject to prior approval by the authorities. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 548-49 (1993); Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ("[P]rior restraints
on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights.").
97 Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 804 (2011).
98 Id. (discussing a law banning depiction of violence in video games marketed to children)
("[T]he Act's purported aid to parental authority is vastly overinclusive. Not all of the children
who are forbidden to purchase violent video games on their own have parents who care whether
they purchase violent video games. While some of the legislation's effect may indeed be in support
of what some parents of the restricted children actually want, its entire effect is only in support of
909
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Although not expressly mentioning the concept of "underinclusivity,"
the Wollschlaeger court effectively also performed an underinclusivity analysis
of the Florida law. The court considered pre-existing Florida law, which allowed
a doctor to terminate his or her relationship with a patient, in light of the
anecdotes in the legislative record that gave rise to the Florida law in the case
before it.9 9 Those anecdotes suggested that some doctors "threatened to end the
physician-patient relationship or to refuse treatment if questions about firearm
ownership were not answered." 1' Yet, the new Florida law-while preventing
doctors from asking their patients about firearms-did not prevent doctors from
terminating the relationship if the patient failed to answer.'o On this point, the
Court stated, "[o]ne would think that, if the prevention of such conduct was the
goal, the Florida Legislature would have prohibited doctors and medical
professionals from terminating their professional relationships with patients who
decline to answer questions about firearm ownership. That would certainly be a
less speech-restrictive solution."10 2 Because the Florida Legislature didn't take
the obvious step that would have addressed the problem that it purportedly
intended to remedy, the law was underinclusive and therefore not narrowly
tailored.' 03
Similarly, the BLPA is underinclusive, but in a more direct way. If the
BLPA intends to prevent infringement of the Second Amendment rights of
customers and employees, it does not go far enough because it only applies to
some customers and employees, and only to some property owners and
employers. For example, while the law protects those customers and employees
who commute to work or travel to business properties by car, it provides no
protection to those customers and employees who walk or bike to work or other
businesses." In fact, the law retains penalties against persons (not otherwise
authorized by statute) who carry firearms into areas of the property, other than
the parking lot, where the firearm is prohibited.o' West Virginia's law is also
underinclusive because it does not apply to employers whose business location
is "the primary residence of the property owner." 106 Thus, if your employer
what the State thinks parents ought to want. This is not the narrow tailoring to 'assisting parents'
that restriction of First Amendment rights requires."); see also Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1313
("The record here demonstrates that some patients do not object to questions and advice about
firearms and firearm safety, and some even express gratitude for their doctors' discussion of the
topic.").
99 Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1315.
100 Id
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See generally W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14 (West 2018).
1os Id. § 61-7-14(c).
106 Id. § 61-7-14(a)(1).
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worked from home, you could not bring your firearm to his or her house even if
it would be locked in your car.107
The BLPA's "underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether
the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring
a particular speaker or viewpoint."' There can be little doubt that the BLPA
favors one viewpoint over another: it favors a pro-gun rights point of view by
mandating silence and acceptance of firearms in parking lots."' The viewpoint
espoused in the BLPA is undoubtedly popular in West Virginia, and West
Virginia legislators, like anyone else, may have legitimate reasons for favoring a
pro-gun viewpoint over another. But the First Amendment prohibits this sort of
viewpoint discrimination because the government can't choose which particular
messages speakers are allowed to convey: "above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.""0
In short, the BLPA targets speech based on its content, if not its
viewpoint; and, because the BLPA is both overbroad and underinclusive, it is not
narrowly tailored and thus fails strict scrutiny. But because BLPA claims are
likely to arise in the employer-employee context, one other theme of First
Amendment jurisprudence is worth mentioning. The Supreme Court has
considered free speech arising in the employer-employee context.'" Those cases
often arise when a public-sector employee has been treated adversely based on
something he or she said. The fact that the employee is a public-sector employee
is critical in these cases since the discharge by his or her public sector employer
is then a matter of government action.
The decisions in employer-employee free speech cases often turn, in
part, on whether speech is a matter of public concern or purely private concern.
Courts apply a different, more-forgiving standard in such cases, often balancing
the competing employer interests and ultimately upholding the discharge while
107 In correspondence about this article, Professor Robert M. Bastress notes that the home is
often treated differently out of concern for individual privacy interests. That is a fair point. But it
is perhaps also fair to note that a homeowner voluntarily abandons at least some aspects of
homeplace privacy when he or she turns his or her home into a business. See, e.g., Avrich v. State,936 So.2d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("Based on the record before us, it is evident that the
defendant made telephone calls to the victim's business telephone line, located in the victim's
home where he conducted his business. Although the victim may enjoy a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his home, that expectation is not extended to his business.").
108 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2367 (2018) (citation
and internal punctuation omitted).
109 The Wollschlaeger court chose not to address whether Florida's similar law constituted
viewpoint discrimination. Wollschlaegerv. Governor ofFla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2017)("Even if the restrictions on speech can be seen as viewpoint neutral-a point we need not
address-that does not mean that they are content-neutral.").
1i0 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citations omitted).
I See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968).
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rejecting claims of First Amendment violations.11 2 Therefore, although BLPA
speech cases may arise in the employer-employee context, it seems fair to say
that those cases will not be like those public-sector workplace speech cases
considered by the Supreme Court. Rather, the speech concerns under the BLPA
have to do with whether the state (through the attorney general) or a private party
(authorized by state statute) may punish an employer's speech about the issue of
guns." 3 The classic, content-based government restriction authorized by the
BLPA is squarely within the mainline of First Amendment strict-scrutiny
precedent.14
Moreover, while some workplace speech may be of such private concern
that First Amendment concerns are not implicated,"'5 speech about firearms and
Second Amendment rights-which state legislative action has sought to
prevent-is undoubtedly of public concern.1 16
112 Id. In order to obtain First Amendment protection, the speaker must have been speaking as
a private citizen, and not as an employee in the exercise of his official duties. See, e.g., Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) ("So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters
of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their
employers to operate efficiently and effectively."). The author thanks Professor Bastress for raising
this point and for the specific citation.
113 But see Norton, supra note 80, at 728 (reviewing laws prohibiting employers from asking
questions which might elicit information that could be used to discriminate against the applicant)
(noting that "[e]xcept for a few cases involving discriminatory advertisements, these provisions
free speech implications have received relatively little attention to date"). While some authors
suggest that laws penalizing employers from asking such questions may violate the First
Amendment, see Yin, supra note 80, at 109, the fact that these laws have not been addressed
extensively by the courts is surprising. The Supreme Court's recent decision in National Institute
of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, which weakens if not eliminates any special exception for
so-called professional speech, may serve to highlight this anomaly. See generally Nat'l Inst. of
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). In any event, it may be possible to
draw the following distinction between the BLPA (which prohibits questions about guns) and the
various federal statutes (which prohibits questions about disabilities, for example): a person's
disability in the context of a job application seems to be more a matter of private concern, whereas
an employer or property owner's desire to ask about firearms is more a matter of public debate and
concern. This is not completely satisfactory, however. The reasoning behind this article implies
that employer questions, not falling under one of the traditional, rare exceptions to the First
Amendment's free speech guarantees, should be protected.
114 See supra notes 77-78.
115 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) ("Not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance, however, and where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First
Amendment protections are often less rigorous.") (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
116 D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008); Hoofnagle v. Smyth-Wythe Airport Comm'n,
2016 WL 3014702, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 24, 2016) ("The subject matter of the email was gun
control, and it was drafted in response to a political solicitation. Although the defendants assert
that Hoofnagle's interest in guns is strictly personal, courts regularly conclude that speech about
the gun control debate constitutes a matter of public concern."); Charles, supra note 4, at 1144
("With Heller having answered the question jurisprudentially by placing the right to keep and bear
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V. CONCLUSION
If this Article has correctly identified a constitutional violation in the
BLPA, the preferred solution is further legislative action. The Legislature could
simply repeal subsection (d)(2)(A) of the BLPA, the section of the Act which
penalizes speech.' 17 By taking such action within its policy-making prerogative,
the Legislature would reaffirm West Virginians' rights both to bear arms and
speak freely.
It is also worth considering potential court challenges to the BLPA. The
Act does not contain a non-severability clause. Therefore, if a court finds the
speech penalties contained in subsection (d)(2)(A) unconstitutional, they are
presumptively severable."'
A court conducting a severability analysis would be asked to determine
whether the remainder of the Act "reflects the legislative will, is complete in
itself, is capable of being executed independently of the rejected portion, and in
all other respects is valid."l 9 Within that analysis, the Supreme Court of Appeals
has held that "[t]he most critical aspect of severability analysis involves the
degree of dependency of statutes."l20 If the valid and invalid statutory provisions
"are so connected and interdependent in subject matter, meaning, or purpose as
to preclude the belief, presumption or conclusion that the Legislature would have
passed the one without the other, the whole statute will be declared invalid."l21
Even without the speech penalties, the BLPA undoubtedly reflects the
legislative will to protect West Virginians' Second Amendment rights. The Act
arms alongside other individual rights, the discourse has now shifted towards the Second
Amendment's proper place in American society, and there is no shortage of viewpoints.").
117 This solution would cure the free speech violation. Whether the statute violates principles
of equal protection or due process are topics outside of the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Fla. Retail
Fed'n, Inc. v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
11 See, e.g., Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Stamm, 664 S.E.2d 161, 163 (W. Va. 2008) ("A statute may
contain constitutional and unconstitutional provisions which may be perfectly distinct and
separable so that some may stand and the others will fall; and if, when the unconstitutional portion
of the statute is rejected, the remaining portion reflects the legislative will, is complete in itself, is
capable of being executed independently of the rejected portion, and in all other respects is valid,
such remaining portion will be upheld and sustained.") (citations omitted). Even if the statute
contained a non-severability clause, such a clause would only serve as a non-binding presumption.
See, e.g., Syl. Pt. 4, Louk v. Cormier, 622 S.E.2d 788, 791 (W. Va. 2005) ("A non-severability
provision contained in a legislative enactment is construed as merely a presumption that the
Legislature intended the entire enactment to be invalid if one of the statutes in the legislation is
found unconstitutional. When a non-severability provision is appended to a legislative enactment
and this Court invalidates a statute contained in the enactment, we will apply severability principles
of statutory construction to determine whether the non-severability provision will be given full
force and effect.").
''9 Louk, 622 S.E.2d at 803.-04.
120 Id. at 804.
121 Syl. Pt. 9, Robertson v. Hatcher, 135 S.E.2d 675, 677 (W. Va. 1964).
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prohibits vehicle searches and adverse action against customers and employees
who want to travel with their firearms safely locked in their cars. That is the core
purpose of the Act according to the Act's sponsors and advocates.
12 2 And the Act
accomplishes that purpose through an otherwise valid 23 and independently
executable system of anti-harassment and anti-discrimination provisions which
do not depend upon Subsection (d)(2)(A)'s penalties.
Guns are very important to West Virginians, "[b]ut the profound
importance of the Second Amendment does not give the government license to
violate the right to free speech under the First Amendment."
24 In its desire to
protect its citizens' Second Amendment rights by passing the BLPA, the West
Virginia Legislature violated its citizens' First Amendment rights. But there is
no reason why it has to be this way. West Virginia citizens should be able to
enjoy the full expression of their speech rights and gun rights without sacrificing
one for the other.
122 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 118.
124 Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J.,
concurring). Statements in Judge Pryor's concurrence in Wollschlaeger concerning the importance
of the doctor-patient candor were cited favorably by the Supreme Court in National Institute of
Family &Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2374 (2018).
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